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RESURRECTING THE PRESS CLAUSE
David A. Anderson

In recent decades, the Press Clause has been no more than an invisible force in
constitutional law, influencing interpretation of the speech clause but having no
independent effect of its own. In the early years of First Amendment jurisprudence the
Supreme Court often relied explicitly on the Press Clause as the source of press rights.
But for the past thirty or forty years, the Court has refused to give the Press Clause any
significance independent of the speech clause. When faced with claims based on
freedom of the press, the Court usually interpreted the speech clause broadly enough to
protect the claimed right, and when that was not possible – when rights were claimed that
could not be made available to all speakers – the court denied them.

This strategy in most instances caused no serious harm to the interests of a free
press. Rights shared with the public at large were just as useful as press-specific rights,
and they deflected the resentments that the latter might have generated. Well-financed
media litigants pursing their own interests won free speech rights for others who might
have lacked the interest or resources to win them on their own. In the few instances in
which the Court rejected press claims, the media were often able to secure passage of
legislation that gave them at least as much protection as the failed constitutional claim
would have provided.
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Now, however, the Court has embarked on a course that makes it more difficult to
avoid the question of special constitutional protection for the press. In a series of cases
culminating this term in McConnell v. the Federal Election Commission, the Court has
held that Congress can restrict the political speech of corporations.1 The decision upheld
key provisions of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance bill, known officially as the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). Corporations are now forbidden to pay
directly2 for “electioneering communications” and may not promote their political views
indirectly through contributions to political parties. The prohibitions extend even to
nonprofit corporations such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Rifle
Association.3

The prohibitions against expenditures and contributions apply to media
companies too, but because news, commentary, and editorials are exempted, the
restrictions give media corporations a political advantage over nonmedia corporations.
“Media companies can run procandidate editorials as easily as nonmedia corporations can
pay for advertisements.”4 Before McConnell, this disparity was not dramatic because the
legislation upheld by earlier decisions only prohibited direct corporate contributions to
candidates, leaving corporations free to promote their political views by buying ads and
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The restrictions apply also to labor unions, and some of them also limit wealthy individuals. For
simplicity’s sake I use “speech of corporations” or “corporate speech” to refer to all the entities to which
the restrictions apply.
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They are still permitted to form Political Action Committees for these purposes, but they may not use
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giving money to political parties and like-minded committees. But the BCRA closes
those avenues of political expression for virtually all corporations (including media
corporations), while leaving the media free to proselytize without restriction through their
editorials and even news columns. Justice Kennedy alleged that McConnell “is the
codification of an assumption that the mainstream media alone can protect freedom of
speech.”

McConnell invites two kinds of Press Clause claims. One kind are the challenges
that will arise, from entities that are undeniably press, if Congress or the state legislatures
attempt to impose new regulations on the political speech of media. Legislators might do
this to reduce the media-nonmedia disparity that McConnell ratifies, or they might do it
simply because they are emboldened by the message that they have considerable power
to limit speech in the interest of curtailing the advantages of wealth in politics.

The second kind of Press Clause claims will come from entities that do not
qualify for the press exemptions in the legislation but contend that they are “press” within
the meaning of the Press Clause and therefore cannot be subjected to the regulations. Not
surprisingly, nonmedia corporations are said to be exploring ways of availing themselves
of the press exceptions – by starting or purchasing newspapers or broadcast stations, for
example. If Congress or the courts attempt to prevent such circumventions by
distinguishing somehow between “real” news media and those that exist primarily to
promote the political views of the parent corporation, some of those denied exemption
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will surely advance claims that they are being denied freedom of the press. Indeed, the
McConnell litigation itself included such a claim.

Unless the Court is prepared to hold that freedom of the press does not include the
right to try to influence elections, it will be difficult to deny some of those claims.
Because many newspapers, magazines, and broadcast outlets today are owned by
conglomerates that also have nonmedia holdings, there is no easy distinction between
“true” media and media that are mouthpieces for nonmedia corporations. It may be even
harder to reject the free press claims of nonprofit corporations, some of which already
have well-established media outlets that seem to be indistinguishable from competing
outlets that are indisputably “the press.”5

In the past the Court avoided difficulties like these by construing the speech
clause broadly enough to obviate the need to single out the press. The dissenters in
McConnell urged that result this time too. All four of them warned that the majority’s
refusal to construe the speech clause broadly enough to protect corporate speech would
have far reaching implications for the role of the press. The majority refused to do so
because it was convinced that unlimited corporate spending threatened the integrity of
American politics. I agree with that premise and with the Court’s decision, and I
therefore do not fault the Court for refusing to give corporations a First Amendment right
to pay for “electioneering communications” and fund the political parties. But the
legislation upheld by the decision sets up such a wide disparity between the political

5

E.g., the Nation magazine, the St. Petersburg Times newspaper, and the Texas Observer, are all widely
recognized as independent voices of political journalism and are all owned by nonprofit foundations.
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power of media and nonmedia corporations that it seems certain to force the Court to
eventually decide two weighty First Amendment questions: Can the political speech of
media be regulated? If not, is it the Press Clause that precludes it?

I. The Press Clause in the early years

“Early” is a relative term here, since the Supreme Court did not begin to make
First Amendment law until well into the twentieth century. In the first twenty or thirty
years of that development, the Court seemed to take the Press Clause seriously. Many of
the great press victories were based explicitly on the Press Clause. The Court said it was
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press that protected newspapers from prior
restraints on publication,6 prevented discriminatory taxation of newspapers,7 allowed
pamphleteers to distribute their writings without a permit,8 and protected editors’ freedom
to editorialize about elections.9

In retrospect, these early cases seem both natural and naïve. The claimants
asserting First Amendment rights were clearly press by any definition, so why shouldn’t
their claims be addressed under the Press Clause? It would have seemed unnatural then if
the Court had chosen to treat them as speech clause claims. At the same time, it appears
that the potential problem of deciding who qualifies as press never occurred to the Court.
[elaborate].
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Gradually that reliance on the Press Clause gave way to less specific attributions,
such as “freedom of speech and press” or “freedom of expression”. In some instances
this may have occurred because press claims and those of nonpress speakers were being
decided in the same case. In Bridges v. California, for example, the Court struck down
contempt citations against the Los Angeles Times and the labor leader Harry Bridges in
the same opinion; New York Times v. Sullivan reversed libel judgments against not only
the Times, but also four individual defendants. Eventually, however, the Court came to
eschew reliance on the Press Clause even when the claim involved only the press.10

This abandonment of the Press Clause as a specific source of constitutional
authority had no immediate consequences, because the Court gave the press whatever
rights it recognized under the speech clause and the press asked no more. But in the
1970s the press began asserting claims that could only be accepted if the First
Amendment gave the press rights that it did not give all speakers. These included claims
that journalists had First Amendment rights to interview prisoners11 and resist
subpoenas12 and search warrants.13 Whether the Press Clause created rights different
from those based on the speech clause for the first time became an issue that had to be
decided.

10

Craig, Pennekamp, Hill
Pell, Saxbe, Houchins.
12
Branzburg v. Hayes,
13
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily
11

6

Justice Stewart argued that it did. He first advanced the argument in 1972 in a
dissenting opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes. The issue in that case was whether the First
Amendment gave journalists a right to refuse to disclose confidential sources – or, as the
majority put it, “require[d] a privileged position for them.” Although Stewart discussed
at length the constitutionally protected role of the press, he did not explicitly ascribe
independent significance to the Press Clause. Indeed, he seemed at pains to ground his
argument in more diffuse notions of the First Amendment:

As I see it, a reporter’s right to protect his source is bottomed on the constitutional
guarantee of a full flow of information to the public. A newsman’s personal First
Amendment rights or the associational rights of the newsman and the source are
subsumed under that broad societal interest protected by the First Amendment.
Obviously, we are not here concerned with the parochial personal concerns of
particular newsmen or informants.14

Nonetheless, it was clear he believed that the First Amendment gave the press rights
different from those of other speakers: his proposed solution to the confidential source
problem was to create a qualified testimonial privilege available to persons he described
as “reporters” or “newsmen.”15

Two years later, Stewart explicitly embraced the Press Clause as a source of
special protection for the press. In an off-the-bench speech that attracted great deal of
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attention, he argued that “the Free Press Clause extends to “the publishing business” an
institutional protection different from that of other Bill of Rights guarantees, including
the speech clause. He argued that the Founders distinguished between freedom of speech
and freedom of the press and intended “the constitutional guarantee of a free press . . . to
create a fourth institution outside government as an additional check on the three official
branches.”

The Court seemed to take that view, at least in dicta, in a decision issued a few
months before Stewart spoke. The case was Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo;
the issue was whether a state could constitutionally require a newspaper to give a right of
reply to a political candidate it had attacked. The Court’s answer was no; the costs to the
newspaper of providing the space and composing time to print the reply would penalize it
for having attacked the candidate, which would tend to deter editors from publishing
material that might trigger the right-of-reply. Such a content-based penalty would be
contrary to general First Amendment principles – a rationale that required no extra
protection for the press. But the Court added another paragraph:

Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with a compulsory
access law and would not be forced to forgo publication or news or opinion by the
inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First
Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors. A newspaper is
more than a passive receptacle for conduit for news, comment, and advertising.
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to
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limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and
public officials -- whether fair or unfair – constitute the exercise of editorial
control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how government regulation
of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with the First Amendment
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.

This explicit resort to the guarantees of a free press, and more importantly, the suggestion
that the First Amendment protected editorial control and judgment from governmental
intrusion into the function of editors, seemed to confirm Stewart’s view. The proposition
that the Press Clause protects editorial judgment has become a central tenet for some who
claim a distinct role for the Press Clause.

II. Abandoning the Press Clause

But 1974, the year of Tornillo and Stewart’s speech, turned out to be the apogee
of the independent life of the Press Clause. The Court did not develop an independent
Press Clause jurisprudence. Indeed, it went out of its way to avoid doing so. The Court
responded to constitutional claims by the press in one of two ways. Whenever possible,
the Court interpreted the speech clause broadly enough to sustain the press claim, thereby
obviating the need to rely on the Press Clause. When that was not possible, the Court
rejected the claim.
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The determination to base protections on the speech clause whenever possible had
many salutary effects. In defamation cases, by basing the constitutional protections on
the speech clause rather than the Press Clause, the Court made them available to speakers
generally, not just the press. Although the history that the Court relied on in New York
Times v. Sullivan was primarily the historical use of libel law to suppress the press, the
Court’s decision was not limited to the Times, but applied equally to four individuals
sued separately for having prepared (bought?) the ad over which the Times was sued. In
a subsequent libel decisions the Court occasionally employed rhetoric suggesting that
nonpress speakers might be less fully protected,16 but in fact it has never failed to give
them the same treatment as media defendants. The result is that the constitutional law of
defamation gives media no advantage over other participants in public discussion. The
same is true of constitutional limitations on other torts, such as privacy and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

Sometimes, however, the Court’s determination to rest protections on the speech
clause rather than the Press Clause forced it to adopt unconvincing fictions. When faced
with press claims for a constitutional right of access to judicial proceedings, the court
responded by recognizing a public right of access instead. The public was not seeking
access to courtrooms, of course, and could not be widely accommodated if it did. The
Court recognized this, and even advised that it would be permissible to exclude members
of the public in order to make room for the press, but insisted nonetheless that the right it
was recognizing was that of the public rather than the press.
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In that context, the impulse to avoid preferential treatment for the press produced
only a harmless and transparent fiction. In others, however, it can produce analytical
confusion. The Court’s cases on differential taxation of media illustrate this. Initially
these cases clearly relied on the Press Clause. The first of them, Grosjean, was easy.
The Louisiana legislature had imposed a two per cent tax on newspapers’gross receipts
from advertising, but exempted all papers with less than 20,000 circulation. Its purpose
was generally understoodto be to punish the 13 largest newspapers in the state, all but
one of which opposed Senator Huey Long, without burdening the smaller newspapers,
most of which supported him. Indeed, Long’s own literature called it “a tax on lying, 2
cents per lie.” The Court reviewed at length the of use of taxation throughout history to
suppress the press or segments thereof, and concluded that the tax in question had “the
plain purpose of penalizing the publishers and curtailing the circulation of a selected
group of newspapers.”17 It was unconstitutional “because it abridges the freedom of the
press.”

The subsequent cases, the Court elaborated and extended the theory that the
history of the Press Clause required special scrutiny of differential taxation of media.
[More on Minneapolis Star, Arkansas Writers,]

For reasons that are not clear, the Court eventually backed away from the
straightforward notion that the Press Clause precluded discriminatory taxation of the
press. In Leathers, the Court reinterpreted the press taxation cases in terms of
discrimination against speakers. Referring to Grosjean, Minnealpolis Star, and
17
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Arkansas Writers, the Court said “These cases demonstrate that differential taxation of
First Amendment speakers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens to suppress the
expression of particular ideas or viewpoints.”18

“Differential taxation of speakers” is a difficult concept to understand. All
taxpayers are speakers; to say they can’t be differentially taxed is to say taxes must apply
uniformly to everyone. But the Court has repeatedly rejected that proposition and did so
again in Leathers, opining that “Inherent in the power to tax is the power to discriminate
in taxation.” So the phrase must refer to taxation of speakers qua speakers . But that is a
problematical concept too. Unless one posits an omnipresent tax collector – one who can
collect the tax whenever someone speaks, a “tax on speech” could not be administered.
A tax on speech about specified subjects, or speech expressing specified views, would be
subject to the same administrative difficulty, and would be subject to the further objection
that the government may not penalize speech on the basis of its content or viewpoint.

As a practical matter, the only way the legislature can differentially tax speakers
is by categorizing them according to tangible indicia that enable the tax collector to
determine who owes the tax and who does not. The only obvious tangible means of
classification is the medium by which the speech is communicated. The shift in Leathers
to the speech clause makes sense only if the Court means to extend the constitutional
limitations on differential taxation to nonpress media – i.e., to hold that in addition to the
anti-discrimination principles that apply to the press because of the Press Clause, the
speech clause limits discrimination among other media.
18

Leathers at 447
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One might suppose the Court thought this necessary because the complaining
taxpayers in Leathers -- cable television operators – were not press. If they were not, the
previous taxation cases would not provide a basis for holding that the cable operators
could not be discriminated against. But that explanation fails, for two reasons. First, the
Court did not hold that the press cases were inapplicable to cable; on the contrary, it said
cable television “is, in much of its operation, part of the ‘press.’” It treated the press tax
cases as relevant precedents, although it expanded the analysis to also include similar
First Amendment claims by nonpress organizations. Second, it did not hold the
discrimination against cable unconstitutional. It upheld the tax discrimination, not only as
to intermedia discrimination between cable and print media, but also as to intramedia
discrimination between cable and satellite services. Although it might have been
necessary to create a new speech-clause-based principle to invalidate the tax
discrimination against cable, it obviously was not necessary to do so to uphold it. If the
Court believed the previous cases did not create a principle broad enough to cover cable,
that by itself would have been a sufficient basis for the decision.

We are left, then, with no explanation for Leathersexcept that the Court wished to
back away from the clear reliance on the Press Clause in the earlier cases and explain
those results in speech clause terms. But those are not readily explainable as speech
clause cases. Here is an instance where the Court’s zeal to avoid reliance on the Press
Clause led it into an untenable, if not incoherent, rationale.
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Another case in which the analysis could have been more straightforward had the
Court been willing to use the Press Clause is Bartnicki v. Vopper. The question was
whether a radio station could be held liable for broadcasting a private cellular phone
conversation that it knew had been recorded in violation of state and federal wiretap laws.
The relevant statutes forbade not only the illegal recording but also intentional disclosure
thereof, and contained no exception for disclosures by news media. The defendants were
clearly liable unless the First Amendment protected them. They argued that the press has
a right to publish even stolen information if it concerns a matter of public importance, but
the Court refused to consider any special right for the press. Instead, it adopted a
rationale that required it to perform contortions, both analytical and factual.

Although it conceded that the wiretap statutes were content-neutral, the Court
subjected them to the strict scrutiny normally reserved for content-based regulations. It
held that the statutes could not be applied to the defendants absent a “need of the highest
order” – the test that was developed in Daily Mail, Landmark Communications, and
Florida Star for statutes that punished speech because of its content. It then held that
neither the government’s interest in discouraging third parties’ use of illegally taped
conversations nor its interest in protecting the privacy of telephone conversations was
sufficient to justify application of the wiretap statutes to disclosures about matters of
public concern by defendants who had nothing to do with the illegal interception. That
formulation of the controlling principle then forced the Court into a factual contortion:
characterization of private telephone conversations as “debate about matters of public
concern.” Unpersuasive as this reasoning may be, it enabled the Court to protect the
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media defendants in that case (and perhaps more important, the New York Times in
another similar case pending at the time Bartnicki was decided), without creating a
specific rule for the press.

These objections to Leathers and Bartnicki are largely aesthetic, however. Up to
this point, the Court’s determination to avoid the Press Clause has done little real harm to
the interests of a free press. The press’s objections to newsroom searches were valid and
compelling, but the Court’s refusal to treat them as a First Amendment problem proved to
be inconsequential. Congress and many state legislatures promptly passed statutes
severely restricting newsroom searches, and the problem has pretty much disappeared.

The Court’s failure to adopt a First Amendment privilege to prevent compelled
disclosure of reporters’ confidential sources has had consequences, but not as dire as
might have been expected. One reason is that here too legislatures stepped into the
breach: more than half of the states now have shield statutes, some of them creating
broader protection than the First Amendment privilege the Court was asked to create in
Branzburg. It is said that Congress was ready to enact a federal shield statute if media
had been able to agree on the scope of protection they wanted. A second reason is that
most federal courts, and a considerable number of state courts, have recognized some sort
of First Amendment privilege despite Branzburg. Those courts limit Branzburg to its
setting – reporters refusing to testify before grand juries – and adopt a privilege like the
one rejected in Branzburg for other types of proceedings, such as criminal and civil trials.
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The Court’s refusal to use the Press Clause to protect confidentiality of news
sources was followed by a great deal of litigation, but how much of that would have been
avoided had the Court decided otherwise is far from clear. The issues being litigated
generally have to do with who may claim the privilege and how much information the
privilege covers – issues that would not have disappeared had the Court recognized a
First Amendment privilege. And just as the media have lobbied legislatures for ever
broader protection, so might they have pressed the Court for expansion of whatever
privilege the Court might have created in Branzburg.

The one area in which the Court’s rejection of Press Clause claims has had
important lasting consequences is lack of access to prisons (and perhaps, by logical
extension, to other public facilities to which press access is limited). The press’s
unsuccessful attempts to create a constitutional right of access seem to have resulted in
some softening of prison rules restricting press access, but there has been no significant
legislative response to the problem. It is impossible to know, of course, how much this
has curtailed news coverage of prisons. It seems clear that the coverage since the mid1970s has not kept pace with the burgeoning prison population over that period, but this
might reflect public (or press) indifference to prison conditions rather than inability to
gain access. If the Court had recognized a constitutional right of access to state prisons,
as it was asked to do in Houchins, and federal prisons as it was asked to do in Saxbe, that
would not necessarily have guaranteed access to those being held in military custody in
the aftermath of 9/11, Afghanistan, and Iraq, but it at least might have provided a basis
for the press to litigate that issue. In the absence of either a constitutional or statutory
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right of access, the press has no clear legal ground to challenge the administration’s noaccess policies.

So far the Court has been able to avoid reliance on the Press Clause. It has been
able to avoid giving the press explicitly preferential treatment under the speech clause,
although the press has been de facto the chief beneficiary of the courtroom access cases,
the Bartnicki case, and the defamation cases.

III. The Campaign Finance cases

Members of the Court recognized early on that regulating the funding of political
campaigns could raise prickly questions about the political speech of the press.
Reluctance to raise such questions clearly played a role in the Court’s decision in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. The Court held that a state statute forbidding
expenditures by business corporations to influence the outcome of referenda violated the
First Amendment. Although the court acknowledged that the press has a “special and
constitutionally recognized role” in informing the public,19 limiting the right to influence
referenda to corporate members of the institutional press “would not be responsive to the
informational purpose of the First Amendment.”20

In a long concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger said failure to protect the
speech expenditures of the bank would also threaten the First Amendment rights of “the
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Belloti at 781
Belloti at fn. 18
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large media conglomerates . . . because of the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of
distinguishing, either as a matter of fact or constitutional law, media corporations from
corporations such as [the bank].” He went on to argue that the Press Clause could not
provide a basis for such a distinction because in his view, the history of the First
Amendment showed that the Press Clause was not intended to confer any special rights
on the press.

The chief justice’s vote was crucial to the Court’s five-member majority. Justice
White, joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall, thought the statute could be
upheld without limiting press speech by distinguishing between, on the one hand, the
press and “corporations formed for the express purpose of advancing certain ideological
causes,” and on the other, “corporations operated for the purpose of making profits.”21
Justice Rehnquist, also dissenting, suggested a distinction that seemed to be based on
corporate law rather than the First Amendment. He said media corporations could be
distinguished from others, such as the bank, on the ground that when the state charters a
corporation for the purpose of publishing a newspaper, “it necessarily assumes that the
corporation is entitled to the liberty of the press essential to the conduct of its business.”
While that liberty would include the right to endorse a candidate in its editorial columns,
the newspaper would have no greater right than any other corporation to contribute
money to a campaign.22 (825).
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In Austinv. Michigan chamber of Commerce, the problem of distinguishing
between the press and other corporations arose in a different way. The nonprofit
corporation challenging a state statute forbidding corporate contributions to candidates
claimed, among other things, that the statute’s exemption of news stories, commentary,
and editorials denied it equal protection. The Court held that “Although the press’ unique
societal role may not entitle the press to greater protection under the Constitution [citing
Bellotti}, it does provide a compelling reason for the state to exempt media corporations
from the scope of political expenditure limitations.”23

[More on the Federal Election Campaign Act pre-BCRA, and on First
Amendment jurisprudence thereon pre-McConnell: Buckley, Mass. Citizens for Life,
Beaumont, National Right to Work, Shrink Missouri Govt]

[Explanation of the BCRA and analysis of McConnell]

The only significant use of the Press Clause in the McConnell litigation was by a
group of libertarian litigants that included Congressman Ron Paul, other libertarian party
candidates, and several nonprofit organizations and political committees. The Paul
Plaintiffs, as the Court described them, did not claim to qualify for the news media
exemptions in the BCRA, which they interpreted as being available only to the
“institutional” press, but argued that they are press, within the meaning of the Press
Clause, because they “publish through press releases, unpaid appearances on radio and
television news, talk, and other shows, through political advertisements in newspapers
23

Austin at 668
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and on radio and television, and through their own outlets – faxes, email, web sites, direct
mail, newsletters, bumper stickers, video and audio tapes, telephone calls, door-to-door
campaigning, speeches, debates, and even a syndicated radio show.”

They claimed the restrictions interfered with their ability to function as
“independent and effective ‘presses’” reporting and commenting on public policy issues,
campaigns, and candidates. They argued that the Press Clause creates an absolute
freedom from licensing, prior restraints, editorial control, forced disclosures, and
discriminatory economic burdens. These prohibitions are more sweeping than those of
the speech clause, they argued, and therefore invalidated many of the BCRA’s
restrictions without regard to whether those served compelling government interests.
The Court rejected the argument in a footnote saying simply that “this contention lacks
merit.”24 Their argument against the section of the statute that increased limits on hard
money contributions was rejected on the ground that they lacked standing.

IV.

Political Speech after McConnell

If and when the hegemony of media political speech that McConnell ratifies is
challenged, one can envision at least three alternative scenarios. The key determinant in
all is whether the Court will hold that media political speech receives more constitutional
protection than that of other corporate speakers.

24

698n. 89.
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Scenario 1: If the Court decides that the political speech of media is entitled to no
more protection than that of nonmedia corporations, media power to influence elections
will exist at the sufferance of Congress. This is the scenario envisioned by Justice
Thomas in his McConnell dissent. He said “Although today’s opinion does not expressly
strip the press of First Amendment protection, there is no principle of law or logic that
would prevent the application of the Court’s reasoning in that setting.”25 In his view,
Congress can have no less power to regulate media political speech than speech of
nonmedia corporations “because of the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of
distinguishing, either as a matter of fact or constitutional law, media corporations from
[nonmedia] corporations.”26

A statutory ban on editorial endorsements would not be the end of freedom as we
know it. Telling people how they should vote is not a core function of a free press. Most
magazines do not endorse candidates or ballot propositions. Some newspapers do not,
and some editors who do have doubts about the propriety of the practice. Until fairly
recently, the ability of radio and television stations to endorse candidates was curtailed by
a requirement that they give the opponent an opportunity to respond. That rule is no
longer enforced, but most broadcast outlets still do not endorse candidates. Restricting
the right of media corporations to editorialize about elections might be viewed by them as
an assault on a freedom they have enjoyed since long before the First Amendment as
adopted, but the dent it would put in the total corpus of media speech about politics
would be a small one.

25
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740, quoting Burger, C.J., concurring, in Bellotti.
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The problem, of course, is that a prohibition against editorial endorsements only
would be impractical. It could easily be evaded by clothing the endorsement as
something else – a commentary, an opinion column, an op-ed piece, or a news analysis.
If the regulatory target is not only endorsements but also attacks, the problem is even
greater. A negative news story may be more effective than an editorial as a tool of
opposition. For these reasons, a legislature bent on restricting the political influence of
media would be unlikely to settle for a ban on editorials. To make that ban effective, the
legislation would have to extend to other forms of media political speech, such as
commentary, analysis, and news coverage. That would go to the core of freedom of the
press, and it would be inconsistent with the longstanding understanding that the press
plays a crucial role in informing the public about matters political.

This scenario is probably unlikely because of the political power of the media. We
have seen previously that the media have had considerable success in getting legislatures
to create entirely new protections for them, in the form of shield statutes and prohibitions
against newsroom searches. They might be expected to have at least as much success
persuading legislatures not to take away longstanding press perquisites such as the right
to freely cover and comment about elections.

Political success is rarely complete, however. Even if the threat of pervasive
regulation of media political speech is remote, the risk of scattered legislative incursions
is real. Legislators have often attempted to regulate particular aspects of media political
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speech. State legislatures have attempted to prohibit the publication of falsehoods about
candidates, give candidates who are attacked in the media a right of reply, prohibit
unsigned editorials endorsing or opposing candidates, restrict election-day endorsements,
and prohibit exit polling. Congress has required broadcasters who provide time to one
candidate to give an equal opportunity to the opponent and required them to offer reply
time to the opponents of candidates they endorse or oppose. Most of these restrictions
have been held unconstitutional, or have been repealed in the face of constitutional
objections, but they show that media power does not always forestall legislation
restricting their political speech.

Unwillingness to give media speech some constitutional preference would very
likely result at least in occasional and peripheral restrictions on the role of the press in
politics. Depending on public sentiment toward the press, the willingness of the press to
defend itself in legislative battles, and the intensity of legislative zeal to curtail the press’s
role, the restrictions could be far more serious.

Scenario 2: The Court might hold that media political speech enjoys more
constitutional protection than the political speech of corporations. This seems to be the
scenario envisioned by Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist in their McConnell
dissents. Neither explicitly endorsed a favored constitutional position for the press, but
both clearly believed that the result of McConnell would be a preferred position for media
corporations in the political dialogue of the nation. (De facto only?) (quotes)
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The Court might attribute the favored treatment of the media to the Press Clause,
or perhaps to some favored-speaker theory developed under the umbrella of the speech
clause. The Court’s history of avoiding reliance on the Press Clause would suggest the
latter course is likely, but in this instance it is hard to see that anything is gained by it. In
previous cases, the strategy of squeezing press claims into a speech clause analysis had
two advantages. One, it made the right available to nonpress speakers too. Second, it
obviated the need to define the press. In this context the strategy would have neither of
those advantages. It would be necessary to define the class of favored speakers by some
means even if “the press” is not the defining concept, and the right would be available
only to those speakers.

Another way of giving preference to media speech without invoking the Press
Clause would be to hold that the risk of corruption that justified the BCRA’s restriction
of corporate political speech does not exist, or is not as great, in the case of media speech.
That argument has already been anticipated, and answered, by Justice Thomas:
“Candidates can be just as grateful to media companies as they can be to corporations and
unions. In terms of the ‘corrosive and distorting effects’ of wealth . . . there is no
distinction between a media corporation and a nonmedia corporation.”27

The majority

was not dissuaded in McConnell, however, and it is entirely possible that a future Court
might decide that a particular restriction on a specific type of media political speech
presents a sufficiently different balance of interests to be distinguishable from McConnell
on familiar speech clause grounds.
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740. See also Rehnquist, dissenting, 780.
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Preferential treatment of media political speech, however it is accomplished
doctrinally, would prevent McConnell from being the disaster for freedom of the press
that Justice Thomas predicted, but it would not be an unmixed blessing, even for the
media. A world in which those who enjoy favored status are surrounded by outsiders
constantly trying to gain admission might threaten, or diminish the value of, perquisites
that the media presently enjoy. Corporations that seek to be media for purposes of
gaining protection for their political speech are likely to also want to share other
advantages that the press enjoys, such as seats in the press gallery, favorable tax
treatment, and exemption from financial disclosure requirements.

More importantly, a wide disparity in political speech rights might create internal
pressures for the media themselves. General Electric, a major defense contractor, is
forbidden, as a result of the BCRA and McConnell, from spending corporate money to
urge the election of members of Congress who appreciate the need for a well-equipped
military. But General Electric also owns NBC and NBC’s 14 network-owned televisions
stations and three cable networks,28 and those entities are free, legally at least, to use their
news programs to influence congressional elections any way they choose. Disney, which
owns ABC and its 10 television stations, and Viacom, which owns CBS and its 16
stations, also have many nonmedia interests on behalf of which they seek to influence
Congress. The same is true of AOL-Time Warner and other conglomerates that have
both media and nonmedia interests.

28

See Who Owns What, cjr.org.
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So far there is little evidence that the conglomerates use their media subsidiaries
to advance the political interests of the parent corporation. The managers of the media
subsidiaries seem to guard their journalistic independence fairly zealously. Nonetheless,
one cannot welcome any development that increases the temptation for parent
corporations to influence the journalistic decisions of their media outlets, or for managers
of the subsidiaries to serve the political interests of the parents without being told to do
so. Creation of a large political advantage for corporations that own media is such a
development.

Scenario 3: In my view, the best post-McConnell course would be one that
includes elements of both of the preceding scenarios. If faced with a substantial
restriction on the political speech of the media, the Court should begin with the course
suggested by Scenario 2. However frustrated or disenchanted we may become from time
to time with the press’s performance of its role in political discussion, that role is too
important to be left to the mercy of legislatures. Imagining a world in which political
discussion is left to the Internet and television commercials should be a sufficient
reminder of the crucial role that the press plays in questioning, verifying, organizing,
synthesizing, and condensing the information we rely on in making political decisions.
Restrictions that seriously interfere with that role ought to be constitutionally forbidden.

That should be accomplished by resurrecting the straight-forward Press Clause
analysis that the Court articulated in Mills v. Alabama: a major purpose of the First
Amendment was to protect discussion of matters relating to politics; the Constitution
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specifically selected the press to play an important role in that discussion; suppression of
the right of the press to clamor for or against change is “an obvious and flagrant
abridgement of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press.”29

Attempting to accomplish this without using the Press Clause is not promising.
Doing it under the speech clause by some sort of ad hoc balancing is too risky. By their
nature, controversies over restrictions on political speech will always be fraught with
political consequences; decisions that turn on assessment of benefits and burdens in
particular cases will always arouse suspicions of political motives. Attempting to
accomplish it under the speech clause by treating the press some sort of favored speaker
complicates speech clause analysis without avoiding the definitional difficulties that arise
from reliance on the Press Clause.

In dealing with those definitional questions, the Court should preserve some of
the legislative autonomy that Scenario 1 envisions. As I have argued elsewhere,30 the
Press Clause should not be read as an anti-discrimination clause. Its purpose is not to
confer individual rights on everyone who can claim the label “press.” To paraphrase
Justice Stewart, its purpose is to protect the full flow of information to the public, and the
individual rights of particular press claimants are subsumed under that broad societal
interest.31 This means that the press’s role in political speech can be protected under the
Press Clause without giving the same rights to everyone who might qualify as press.
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219.
Freedom of the Press, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 429 (2002).
31
408 U.S. 726 n. 2.
30
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This is a difficult interpretation to accept because it differs so dramatically from
speech clause jurisprudence, where nondiscrimination among speakers is an article of
faith. The marketplace model of free speech is so deeply entrenched that it is unpopular,
if not unthinkable, to suggest that free speech interests could be served without giving
everyone the same right to speak.32 But sensible interpretation of the Press Clause begins
with an understanding that it is different from other Bill of Rights provisions. As Justice
Stewart pointed out, most of those protect specific rights of individuals, while the Press
Clause protects an institution. That means that a law violates the Press Clause only when
it compromises the institutional role of the press, not when it merely denies a right to an
individual member of the press. A litigant advancing a Press Clause claim should not be
able to succeed by showing that he or she has been denied a right given to another
member of the press; success should require a showing that the challenged restriction
threatens the ability of the press to perform its role.

That, of course, is a hard distinction to maintain. Only the law’s effects on
particular components of the press can compromise its ability to carry out its institutional
role, and only the press entities or individuals who are affected can bring litigation to
protect the institutional role of the press. Requiring them to assert and show not merely
an interference with their own ability to function as press, but also a threat to the press as
an institution, gives them an unfamiliar burden. But an interpretation of the Press Clause
that prevents legislative discrimination among members of the press is unworkable. The

32

Such heresies do occasionally get articulated. “What is important is not that everything be said, but that
everything worth saying be heard.” In a few instances, the Court seems to have actually embraced a First
Amendment theory based on the need to receive information rather than the right of the speaker to speak.
See Va. Pharmacy.
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press receives a great deal of favorable treatment by law, and is therefore defined
legislatively for many different purposes, ranging from access to the White House to tax
exemption to protection from searches and subpoenas. An interpretation of the Press
Clause that created uniform press rights as a matter of constitutional law would inevitably
interfere, possibly fatally, with the existing universe of nonconstitutional press
preferences.

To put that concern into the context of politics in the post-McConnell world, there
are many different ways of regulating media political speech – by deciding which
members of the press get to ask questions in political debates, who gets access to
candidates and incumbents, when election results may be projected, whether a
“newspaper” is really a campaign flyer. Constitutional law is not a sufficiently flexible
mechanism to deal with all such questions. That is why Congress and the state
legislatures must retain a great deal of leeway in deciding how, and by whom, the
institutional role of the press is to be fulfilled. Ultimately, however, the freedom of the
press to influence politics must be constitutionally protected.
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